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Abstract
This paper focuses on ways to improve NASA's technology
transfer system. The analysis in this paper assumes that
an improvement of the current status can be achieved if the
technology transfer process is better understood. This
understanding will only be gained if a detailed knowledge
about factors generally influencing technology transfer is
developed, anz particularly those factors affecting tech-
nology transfer from government R&D agencies to industry.
Secondary utilization of aerospace technology is made more
difficult because it depends on a transfer process which
crosses established organizational lines of authority and
which is outside well understood patterns of technical;
applications.
In the absence of a sound theory about technology trans-
fer and because of the limited capability of government
agencies to explore industry's needs, a team approach to
screening and evaluation of NASA generated technologies is
proposed in the analysis which follows. The proposal calls
for NASA, and other organizations of the private and public
sectors which influence the transfer of NASA generated tech-
nology, to participate in a screening and evaluation process
to determine the commercial feasibility of a wide range of
technical applications.	 .
DING PAGE a"ANK T
NO FILMED
YpECE
iii
Table of Contents
Page
Introduction . . 	 . . .	 .	 .	 1
1. Description and evaluation of the NASA
Technology Transfer Program . . . . . . . . . . 	 5
2. Analysis of factors influencing the
application of a new technology .	 . . .	 . . 1l
2.1 Factors which influence technology
transfer	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 12
2.2 Factors influencing technology transfer
from a government R&D agency to industry . 23
2.3 Summary evaluation of factors
influencing technology transfer . . . . . . 29
3. Assessment of Arguments for a 'Team Apnroach
to Screening/Evaluation . . . . . . . 	 . . . . 35
3.1 Advantages of a team approach tc
screening/evaluation . . . . 	 . . . . . . 35
3.2 Disadvantages of a team approach to
screening/evaluation . . . . . . 	 . . . . 39
3.3 Review of a team approach to
screening/evaluation 	 . . . . .	 . . . . 43
4. Potential Members for the Team . . . . . . . . . 44
Conclusions	 . .	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 48
References . .	 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 49
.v
Introduction
In providing for the widest practicable and appropriate
dissemination of inform p:tion about its R&D activities, NASA
faces a task of vast scope and substantial complexity.
In fulfilling its task NASA must solve vwo complex
problems:
o The Information Problem
The secondary utilization of aerospace technology poses
a question that is difficult to answer; "How can an unknown
target group in industry be provided with a technology having
unknown applications?" In order to respond to this challenge
NASA must necessarily initiate "horizontal" technology trans-
fer through a communication process which crosses institutional
and organizational boundaries. This process is not well
understood.
To transfer the right information to the right target
group is a difficult task. But, this is only one part of the
technology transfer process. Information dissemination is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for technology
transfer (see also: Baer et al., 1976, p. 27).
o The Application Problem
There exists a spectrum of potential reasons why industry
does not accept a known technology. Technologio-al feasibility
is no guarantee of commercial success. Furthermore, new
technologies are very often not only market-creating but also
market-destroying.
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Studies indicate that NASA performs excellent wore in
disseminating information. That is not to say that there do
not exist ways of improving the NASA information dissemi-
nation system. in addition, based on an interpretation of
investigations performed by the Denver Research Institute, it
appears that opportunities for substantial improvement exist
in the application process.
Rather than attempting to improve the technology dis-
semination system through a new kind of technical report, it
may be more beneficial to :,Improve the information itself.
More potential value could be added to the information system
by detailing competitive technologies, by indicating neighbor-
ing technologies which already exist or are developing, by
suggesting possibilities for useful applications, and by
providing commercial feasibility information. Such activities
impact on the application problem in a positive manner (see
also: Chakrabarti, 1972, p. 7).
In order to effectively provide this "value added infor-
nation," one must understand the supply characteristics of
NASA technologies with regard to potential commercial appli-
cations and specific demand characteristics of potential. users.
In addition, one should be aware of "what is going on"
in industry and between industry and government agencies.
How can such a task be accomplished? An important step
is to enhance the screening/evaluation process of NASA
generated technologies. That is to say, enhancing the ability
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to anticipate the future valve of a NASA technology and
thereby choose an effective transfer medium. Since no
comprehensive detailed knowledge about the many facets of
technology transfer axists, two possibilities seem worth
pursuing in the screening/evaluation process.
o Statistical Analysis
Based on existing historical. data, one can try to
determine the relevant characteristics of technologies
which enhance their value for potential users.
Such statistical analysis could provide substantial
insights. Industry, however, frequently reorganizes its
structure and changes its need,, so statistical analysis
is of limited value. But, statistical analysis might be
used for preevaluation, thereby filtering out presumably
valuah1e technologies to be evaluated by a team.
o Team Approach
Evaluation using a team approach is suggested here using
teams that include members of the user community, such as
professional associations, and governmental agencies, which
are concerned with regulation and commercial R&D. Such an
approach would enhance the technology transfer process.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the potentials
of a team approach to the screening/evaluation process. This
approach creates two substantial benefits:
W Given a lack of knowledge about the complexities of
technology transfer, this approach could become a powerful
tool in overcoming those complexities.
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(ii) Technology tr&nsfer is important for all members
of a society and should therefore not be the sole concern of
an R&D agency like NASA. A team approach would promote
acceptance of the view that technology transfer is the common
revponsibility of all participants in the commercial utiliza-
tion of advanced technologies.
To outline the characteristics of a team approach to
screening/evaluation, this paper is organized as follows:
Description and Evaluation
of the NASA Technology Transfer Program
Analysis of Factors Influencing the
Application of New Technologies7-
Factors Influencing	 actors Influencing Technolog
Tect..nology Transfer
	
ransfer from a Government R&
Summary Evaluation of Factors
Influencing Technology Transfer
Assessment of Arguments for
Screening/Evaluation by Team Approach
Advantages	 Disadvantages
Review of Screening/Evaluation
by Team Approach
Potential Members for Screening/Evaluation by Team Approach
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In the first section belrow, the NASA information system
is described and evaluated. This evaluation-t suggests that
NASA improve the information itself rather than modifying
the information dissemination system.
An assessment of factors which are likely to impact on
technology transfer is made in the second section. At the
end of this section, improvements achievable using a team
approach are discussed.
The third section assesses arguments for a team approach
to screening/evaluation.
Potential members of a screening/evaluation team are
noted and their capaLilities explored in the fourth section.
1. Description and evaluation of the NASA Technoloc
rocrram
The NASA Technology Transfer (TT) program consists primarily
of Information Dissemination, Application Teams, Information
Dissemination Centers, and Applications Engineering. For the
purpose of this paper, this transfer system is viewed as three
phases:
INFORMATION PHASE
o library service
o delivery service (technical, reporting)
MARKETING PHASE
o identification of potential users' needs
o identification of technologies matching users' needs
5
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APPLICATION PHASE
o demonstration projects
o reengineering projects
o production of marketable products
The development of the process can be thought of as an
evolution. In its information phase, information is provided
for the users. In order for technology transfer to happen,
the user must play an active role. NASA's role is more passive,
once information has been made available. The li.bacary service,
for example, consists of a set of interrelated services. in
the literature csearch service ("remote") the user is aotive;
he defines key words which are used for information retrievals
performed by Industrial Appl.icaticns Center's (IAC) personnel.
The next extension is an interactive retrieval service (on-site);
the user sits beside the "Information Spa Aal,ist," who now
plays an active part due to his knowledge about the NASA data
base. He is able to identify keywords the user might never
think of. In a current awareness search service (period"
ical. reports which supply the user with up-to-date information
in his field of interest, generally delivered on a monthly
basis), the user defers to the search service totally. NASA's
role is more active in cases where the user requests inter-
pretative services and NASA parlU cipates in the exploration
of the retrieved information.
Staffed with highly qualified scientists and engineers,
Industrial. Applications Centers provide not only information
but potential applications of information. An IAC's staff
s
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personnel may initiate contact between a requester and com-
panies, universities, etc., already working in a certain field.
In the marketing phase, perio rmeed by State Application
Centers and Technulogy Application Teams, NASA takes a more
active role. exploration of a user's needs, search for a
technology which will match those needs and them implementation
and commercialization of the techn*logy (see Anyos et al., 1979.
p. iii). in the application phase, NASA reengineers technologies
in order to bring them closer to commercial feasibility,
Studies investigating the benefit-to-cost ratios concerning
the main elements of the NASA Technology Transfer program
show a positive relationship. The aggregate benefit-to-cost
ratio was estimto n- be 6 s l: The
 single alemento o f
 the
program are characterized by ratios lying in a spectrum 3 1
to 26 ; 1 (Johnson et al., 1977b, p. v, vi). For each dollar
NASA invests in its TT Program, benefits equival,.ent to six
dollars are produced.
When interpreting these numbers, one must take several
factors into account. First, Such benefit-to-cost ratios
cannot be directly compared with those of other NASA projects.
Of course, the ratios calculated for the NASA TT program do not
reflect the investment in developing the technology. ,Second,
each NASA contractor must write a contractor report, which can
be thought of as an initial step toward producing an information
product, the costs of which are not covered by the TT program.
In assessing possibilities for further improvements of the
J	 TT program, an analysis of the NASA Tech Brief Program, under-
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rtaken by the Deaver Research Institute, is most valuable
(0'ohnson et al., 1977a, p. 36). They classified TT applications
in four modes:
mode 0 no application at all
mode l used for information only
mode 2 used to improve already {existing production
technologies, products and services
mode 3 used to develop new production technologies,
products and services
The probability for any of the individual modes occurring were
calculated as follows:
mode	 probability
C	 34%
1	 54%
2	 11%
3	 1%
The 54% for mode 1 indicates that NASA is providing an
excellent .information service. There is no other information
service available which covers the aerospace area and related
fields in such a comprehensive way. This is true partly be-
cause the NASA data base includes information produced by other
organizations. For example, due to a special information ex-
change agreement between the NASA Scientific and Technical.
Information Office (STIO) and the European Space Agency (ESA),
i
	
	 a user can obtain the latest international developments in
this field.
The results of the DRI study show a very different .picture
concerning the development of new products from NASA technical
information: "Successful efforts to develop new products from
TSP's have occurred but they are exceptions. More typically,
such attempts lead wo a new financial loss for the TSP requester.
Even for successful Mode 3 application (development of new
technologies, products, services), the TSP information is
usually a minor technical. input (about 5 percent) to the new
economic activity" (Johnson et al., 1977x, p. 98).
At the present time, it seems that the most positive out-
come of NASA's TT program is that the information about its
technologies is available promptly and comprehensively.
The calculated net benefit for the Industrial Application
Centers is moderate compared to those of the technical, reporting
program. one might expect the c or .-rary, du€ to the comprehensive
and thorough services provided by IACs. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that while technical reports are free, users
are charged for the services of the ZACs. The benefit-to-cost
ratios currently available may not describe the true picture.
Out of a vast set of new technologies, most will have little
or no impact on new products and services. There is a small
subset of technologies which are, unexpectedly, so successful
that they 'pay for the whole R&D program of an organization.
To enhance the effectiveness of NASA's TT prograzti, it
would be useful to know about the underlying factors which
influence technology transfer. For example, it is not particu-
larly useful to calculate time-lags between the technological
feasibility and the first commercial application of a technology;
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indeed, those calculations show :substantial variations (see;
Rosenberg, 1976a, pp. 72-74). There are many different factors
at work and without a detailed understanding of those factors
it is hard to initiate efforts to make technology transfer
more effective.
NASA technology has the potential to improve existing
technologies and to develop new production technologies, pro-
ducts and services. However, an improvement of the technology
information dissemination system by itself is not likely to
lead to a substantial change. Producing acid reproducing in-
formation about a technology where there are barriers in the
application of this technology is not likely to lead to better
results. In one case hundreds of TSPs were requested regard-
ing a new gas turbine seal., but there were no applications
because no firm was willing to take the necessary substantial
commercial risk. If a procedure existed, e.g. a team approach
to screening/evaluation by which NASA anticipated such a pro-
blem, NASA could offer more help. For example, where potential
users of a new technology such as governmental organizations
are identified, NASA might develop a prototype if the technical
risks were so high as to inhibit further development.
The key for solving the applications problem is a mechanism
which enables NASA to explore the potential commercial environ-
ment for a certain technology which is announced through the
TT program. This is the underlying basis for the suggestion
of technology screening/evaluation using a team approach.
10
t2. Analysis of
	
t
Technology transfer is a complex process which is not well
understood (Hoelscher, Hummon, 1977, p. 76), especially hori-
zontal technology transfer or secondary utilization. There
may be hundreds of potential secondary applications of aero-
space technology, but it is extremely difficult to identity
them. Indeed, it might be difficult to think of any useful
applications of a new technology at all. Thomas Edison is
reported to have tho"ght that a phonograph would be used to
record the wishes of dying men (Rosenberg, 1976a, p. 197).
In the secondary utilization of aerospace technology, it
is often remarkable how remote the secondary utilization is
From the original .space application. A joint NASA/military
project on helicopter rotors produced a vibration dampening
technology, now used in building guitars (Haggerty, 1978, p. 34).
in anticipating secondary utilization one faces an "open-
ended" problem. 'there will never be a method r'or identifying
all the possible or useful non-aerospace applications of a
NASA technology. "It is important that one never knows in
advance if spinoffs will occur, or what their benefits may (or
may not) he. Because of this uncertainty, spinoffs are nothing
to bank on." (Thurow, 1978, p. 69.) It might be worthwhile
to initiate a potential applications "creativity-session" for
selected technologies. Such value added to a purely technical
description of a new technology might enable a reader of a
TECH BRIEF to envision many possible applications and ultimately
to develop a useful application.
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Before one explores the potential value of a technology,
an idea for the application of that technology is necessary.
One can then begin to assess the impacts of factors influencing
the technology transfer process. A knowledge of such factors
and their impacts on technology transfer is important in esti-
mating the probability of an industrial application of a
technology. in the following paragraphs some of those factors
are discussed.
2.1 Factors which influence technology transfer.
The following section describes some factors which generally
influence technology transfer as wf,%11 as specific factors which
influence transfer from government R&D agencies to industry.
o All: technologies have certain characteristics making
them advantageous for some applications and useless for others.
The application of numerical control in the machine tool in-
dustry is not economical for long production runs. Other
factors like preparatory and maintenance work have to be taken
into account, especially if a skilled work force is scarce.
(see also: Ray, 1969, p. 58). One must also check the impacts
of a new technology on the organization of the whole production
system. This is extremely important in industries like the
chemical industry which is characterized by close and inter-
dependent relations between materials, energy and information
flows. Often, a new technology - even if only a small piece -
can only be used advantageously if the whole production system
is reorganized. If. the investment expenditures for '•:,lie re-
12
organization are greater than the anticipated cost reduct.,ons
caused by the use of the new technology, the latter will be
ignored.
it is extremely difficult - if not impossible - ' to detail
the general characteristics of technologies, due to the fact
that production systems differ from industry to industry and
even within a certain industry. Quite a few mathematical
models have been developed to dascribe the behavior of an
industry, e.g. the oil industry. But the value of those models
for the explanation of industry's behavior concerning the
adoption of new technologies is only moderate (Lapple, 1978,
p. 284). Assume that there are two different technologies for
the production of a certain product, one of which is relatively
more energy consuming than the other one. Without specific
knowledge about the production system of a firm, there is no
to anticipate which of the two technologies will be applied.
For example, the more-energy-consuming technology might produce
valuable by-products which far outweigh the cost advantages
achieved by using the less-energy-consuming technology.
In the screening and evaluation of NASA generated tech-
nology it is valuable to know about the factors described above.
It is extremely difficult to achieve such detailed knowledge
on an industry-by-industry
screening/evaluation using
asset in gaining knowledge
specific technologies whic;
transfer process.
basis. In this context, technology
a team approach would be a valuable
about those characteristics of
are relevant to the technology
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o The degrees of technical and business alignment
between industries is an important parameter in the technology
transfer process. It is reasonable to assume that the less
alignment between industries exists the less likelihood there
is of successful technology transfer between industries, an"'
the more important technology transfer programs become in
promoting the transfer process (see also: Kottenstette,
Rusnak, 1973, p. 106). Therefore, knowledge of the degree of
technical and business alignment between industries is essential
to planning technology transfer programs.
o Due to the fact that each field in science and tech-
nology has developed its own information channels and has
created individual problem-solving methodologies, there exist
interdisciplinary barriers. Normally, people not trained in
a special field are unable to communicate with people who are.
The party unable to understand a certain professional language
may be unwilling or unable to learn this language. Consequently,
there exist barriers between fields in science and technology.
The difficulty of overcoming interdisciplinary barriers can be
assessed by analyzing an interdisciplinary field. in the
American Journal of Operations Research about 10% of published
articles are of interest to a special target group but actually
only 2% to 4% reach this target group (see: Pierskalla, 1979,
p. 8) due to "language" problems. ,
Of course, to overcome those problems spec-ialized journals
can be issued. The Operations Society of America is doing this,
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for example, by issuing the Journal of Transportation Science.
Within this Society there are plans to pursue this approach
in other areas by issuing journals on such topics as public
systems and marketing (Little, 1979, p. 4). NASA uses a
similar technique when it issues bibliographies in areas such
as Aerospace Medicine, Biology, Earth Resources, and Energy.
This approach, issuing journals in selected areas, has
limited advantages. It is impossible to issue journals in all
areas of potential interest and, furthermore, people are
often reluctant to use new journals.
A different approach could be adopted. Rather than issue
journals, it is possible to develop close relationships with
societies already covering a certain field and publish articles
in established journals. A team approach to technology
screening/evaluation is based upon strong relationships with
organizations which cover different areas in science and
technology. Doors to these areas would then be opened.
o Estimation of the relative efficiency of a new tech-
nology in comparison to already existing ones is an important
factor to take into account. Often a new technology offers
few or no advantages in terms of technical and cost aspects
when compared to those already in use (see also: Cooper, et al.,
1973, p. 56). Sometimes engineers need a substantial amount of
time to find out efficient ways to operate a new process. This
is particularly true for chemical process industries due to
the absence of a comprehensive understanding of the production
Often, technologies already in use experience substantial {
improvements when a new technology is expected to enter the
1
market. For example, the slow diffusion of the steam engine
i
in the United States was caused, by ,improvements in water-wheel
i
technology (Rosenberg, 1972/73, p. 24) . Estimation of
"switch-over-points," and the efficiency curves of old and
new technologies, is a difficult task, In most commercial
enterprises, it is rare that a new technology can be used
wi', i great success immediately. This situation delays the 'use
of a new technology. The knowledge of this delay is of major
interest due to the fact that the new technology might itself
become obsolete prior to implementation.
o In some cases one would fail in judging the value of
a new technology without analyzing its "neighboring" technologies.
To some extent, each technology is dependent on other technologies.
For some new technologies, essential neighboring technologies
might not be available. Consequently, one must overcome numerous
bottlenecks (Rosenberg, 1976, p. 125). Often, efficient tech-
nologies cannot be used because "parallel necessary technology
did not arise elsewhere." (Locke, 1978, p. 25.) It takes time
to make neighboring technologies available due to the fact that
6 to 10 years are often required to develop a process from pilot
stage to industrial scale. if such bottlenecks are anticipated,
one can initiate appropriate steps to make the new technology
more readily available for applications in the commercial area.
o In almost all cases production technology is capital-
intensive. if an industry is dominated by a small number of
16
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big firms, they might agree to ignore a new technology in
case it would cause a major impact on existing production
technology. A study of Du Pont rayon .plants points out that
delays in applying new technology stemmed from the fact that
the new technology required new investments (Hollander, 1965,
p. 199). If capital goods already in use are relatively
new and characterized by long life cycles, the long-run cost
advantages of a new technology might be outweighed by short-
term financial returns (Ray, 1969, p. 45).
The behavior of the American steel industry in the fifties
can be cited in this context. Although the oxygen furnace
process had proven superior to the open-hearth process ir,
Europe (Gruber, 1969, p. 43), the U.S. Steel industry switched
over to the oxygen furnace process relatively late. The capi-
tal intensiveness of the production technology seemed to be a
major reason for this delay (see also: Gruber, 1969, p. 49,
50). A spokesman for the U.S. Steel Corporation said that:
"Nobody who has efficient open-hearth furnaces is going to
throw them out to buy oxygen furnaces. we waited until we
needed to replace old capacity." (in: Ray, 1969, p. 45.)
on the other hand, if a new technology is able to overcome
bottlenecks in an existing production system and thereby offer
incremental change compatible to the existing technology, it
is likely that such a technology would be used immediately.
An investigation performed by Wright points out that industry's
interest regarding those NASA generated technologies offering
improvement on existing technologies was nearly eight times
17
rgreater than industry's interest in technologies not compatible
to those already in use (cited in: Chakrabarti, 1972, p. 7).
o An important factor in technology transfer is the
comparative advantage a firm gains in using a new technology.
in judging contractual arrangements one should take into account
that "the smaller the variation in comparative advantages among
prospective innovators of the same idea the Less will the exclu-
sive right to invent be worth, even ,4,f the returns were fully
capturable" (Cheung et al., 1976, p. 19).
Regulations requiring mandatory use "of the best available
technology" are also an important consideration. In a case
where a new technology will turn out to be a "best available
technology," an innovator will not enjoy a comparative advantar¢
due to the fact that other firms are forced by law to follow.
Furthermore, other firms then have an incentive to hinder
potential innovators (Hill, 1975, p. 139).
Another case to consider is a major change of therP oduc,_
tion technology in an entire industry branch. At present,
some 80 percent of products in the chemical industry depend on
oil. To switch to coal, major changes must take place. If one
firm goes ahead it will face tremendous risk. Other firms,
choosing the "second is fastest" strategy, would gain technical
knowledge by monitoring the research work of the innovator
(Thurow, 1978, p. 70). They will follow only if it is econom
i.cal to do so. The first firm may not gain substantial compar-
ative advantages. 19 one is able to anticipate such factors, one
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can arrange appropriate steps; for example, joint projects
between NASA and all major firms within an industry branch,
or an industry association.
o New technologies are both market-creating and markew-
destroying. Market-destroying effects will be greater the
more existing technology is integrated into the production
system. It is important to realize that it is insufficient
to assess those effects only at the firm level. For example,
replacement of pesticides might impact the cosmetics :industry
because both industries use common raw materials. Also,
restrictive sulphur emission standards caused oil companies
to develop technologies to produce sulphur out of their residuals.
Consequently, medium-sized firms which produced sulphur out
of elementary sulphur were nearly eliminated. Finally, West
Germany experienced labor strikes due to the introduction of
text processing technologies. Printers were frightened of
losing their jobs overnight.
Attempts of oil companies to achieve control over com-
petitive uranium and coal technologies "may be seen as
attempts to assure long-term market oontrol by minimizing the
potential threats arising from technological breakthroughs in
the provision of substitute products." (Rosenberg, 1976b,
p. 533). A recent example is the behavior of the electric
utilities towards solar power due to the fact that such a
decentralized energy source does not fit the structure of
existing centralized power line networks (Commoner, 1979,
pp. 69-71)
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Those examples clearly show that the market-destroying
effects of a technology may lead to the non-application of a
new technology or at least a delay in the diffusion process.
In assessing the value of a new technology, it is important to
keep in mind that it must "become an element of the socio-
technological fabric" (Hoelscher, Hummon, 1977, p. 78) and
for a ,firm "of the various kinds of environmental change,
few are more pervasive or important than technological change"
(Cooper et al., 1973, p. 54).
o Regulation is an important factor to take into account.
A major influence is expected from regulations implemented in
the form of so-called design characteristics. A firm may feel
it is inconvenient to try to change governmental rules for the
benefit of a minor improvement and thereby will not use a
technology which only leads to moderate benefits.
However, careful analysis can help anticipate industry's
behavior. Regulation causes technology arrestment as well as
technological advance. one of the industries most affected by
environmental regulation is the chemical and allied products
industry. This industry claims that this kind of regulation
leads to a decline in capital productivity due to the fact
that investments for reduction of emissions decrease the amount
of capital used for the pz,;, :3uction line. This argument holds
true, but only assuming that no technological advances are
made. Indeed, under ,
 this assumption a substantial quantity of
capital has to be invested for the treatment of residuals
without any benefit for the production processes. An investi-
20
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igation performed in West Germany (Meissner, Hoedl, 1978)
showed that industry hay strong incentives to change this
"unpleasant" situation, and one efficient means to do so is
to change the production technology. In this case, regulation
caused a need for new technologies. In general, only detailed
analyses will lead to a well balanced judgement about the
	 3,
impacts o regulation on technology transfer.
o Another extremely important factor is the relation
between he developmentoof a technological innovation and the
development of the diffusion process. It seems reasonable
to assume that industry will slow down the adoption of new
technologies if the speed of innovations is high. This
assumption is based on the fact that firms face the danger of
investing in "'soon-to-be-obsole-*^ e technol.c ,y . " (Rosenberg,
1976b, p. 514.) While such a pattern might be characteristic
of a lot of cases, it does not hold for all. In the computer
industry, important innovations are characterized by a diffusion
time of 3 to 5 years; innovations of less importance are
delivered to the market within 1 year. Firms must be heavily
active in R&D in order to achieve a competitive position in the
market (Dunn, 1979, pp. 3-4).
Competition is a strong force in pvomoting the application
of new technologies (Gruber, 1969, p. 40). in assessin g rates
of innovation and diffusion, competition should be taken into
account.
o Dependent on its stage of development, a firm shows
different re ponsiven•ess to different kinds of innovations.
21
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iUtterback offers the following model for explaining this
phenomena (1976, p. 36)
During the first stage, development is based on product
change primarily. Consequently, product innovations have
priority over process innovations. Based upon experiences,
e.g. in the semi-conductor industry, firms concentrating on
procp3s innovations in this early stage face the danger of
improving the production-technology of a product which soon
becomes obsolete.
The second stage finds established firms in an industry
booking for process innovations. These small changes, com-
patible with the existing production system, reduce costs of
i
	 existing products.
In the last stage, established firms have an incentive
to delay major technical changes because of the inflexibility
of capital-intensive production systems. it might be possible
to obtain such knowledge by monitoring the development of an
industry.
i
	
	 Those factors influencing technological change mentioned
above provide a few hints, the list is neither complete nor
exhaustive. Yet, the rather brief discussion showed the
k
	
	
importance of those factors and the difficulty of exploring
their impact on technology transfer. To make technology
transfer more effective, however, knowledge about such factors
seems to be essential, (see also McClain, 1976, p. 116). There-
fore, I will now explore the impacts of such factors on the
secondary utilization,on cif aerospace technology. Anticipation
22
luencin technol
to in^v.
transfer from a government2.2
of those impacts is a necessary condition for choosing
appropriate steps in "putting technology to work."
The factors discussed above are generally important.
Those factors analyzed in what follows are of particular
interest if the transfer process takes place between a govern-
mental agency to industry. The analysis will focus on such
factors important to NASA's TU program.
o For the successful introduction of a new technology the
relation between innovation and innovator is most important.
Therefore, many firms have adopted a procedure whereby the
A nnovator becomes the 'product ^mianager for his vin product. This
reflects the fact that an innovation needs a key individual
who pushes it from innovation to commercialization. An empirical
investigation of NASA generated technology further points out
that the involvement of the innovator in the usage of the inno-
vation is important for success (Chakrabarti, 1972, p. 28).
Furthermore, an investigation of federally funded demonstration
projects showed that i., cases where the project initiative
originates from nonfederal sources, the diffusion process is
better than projects initiated by a federal agency (Baer et
al., 1976, p. 48).
o Psychological barriers to the use of government in-
formation and technology and, to some extent, the restricted
availability of government information must be taken into
account. Up until now industry has hesitated to use govern-
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mental information and technology. There is - justified
or not - a concern that government might try to influence its
activitie-o or at least monitor requests. This problem is re-
inforced because NASA's data base is not as easily available
as other federal data bases. But it seems likely that such
barriers can be overcame. A DRI study points out that users,
if they have once used NASA services successfully, are likely
to do so in the future. A review of the number of users of
NASA's data base appears to show an educational process taking
place.
Concerning the restricted availability of NASA literature,
it is worthwhile to think about improvements. It normally
takes a user 1 to 2 weeks to receive the printouts of a
literature search service. The information is rarely published
in widely available professional journals. Instead it is
published in NASA journals which are in most cases only avail-
able in NASA Centers a,ad through the National Technical
Information Service. Consequently, it takes at least one to
two months before a user receives the .information.
Further, it might be valuable to improve the "On-Site"
literature search service. An intelligent user should be
able to screen the information while sitting at the terminal;
under current conditions, it is too time consuming to do so.
To improve the procedure, "touch-panel" terminals could be
installed at the Industrial Application Centers. Those in-
dustries remote from the aerospace industry are more likely to
be attracted if access to NASA information is made easier.
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o The value of NASA generated technology is of critical
importance. NASA's philosophy - especially that of the IAC's -
that it is wasteful "to reinvent the wheel" - is often not
accepted by industry regarJ ing NASA generated technology (see
e.g. Olken, 1972, p. 617). It has been argued that NASA
technology is the result of reorganizing what was already at
hand, that is to say NASA technology lacks novelty. Miniatur-
ization was a new concept in the sixties but is now a well-
known design technique. In general, government information
is characterized by the labels too much, low value.
To counter such Labels, many factors must be explored.
At first, it is quite natural that "massive -mobilization R&D
projects" (Thurow, 1978, p. 30) like Apollo and the Space-Shuttle
can be successfully performed only if the basic knowledge
about the technologies employed already exists.
This means that NASA technologies are in a much more
advanced application stage. This should not be confused
with the value of such technologies. This situation reinforces
the need to develop a technological classification scheme which
separates basic knowledge, engineering-application knowledge,
etc. This classification scheme would enable NASA "to shoot"
at appropriate target groups with efficient transfer mechanisms.
it is extremely important that a rapid transfer of engineering-
applications takes place due to the fact that such knowledge
rapidly becomes obsolete. In such cases, it is not a question
of technological availability but of whether the technology
is known to all potential users. This leads to a second
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important fact. A certain technology might be well known; a
special technique might be general knowledge in one industry,
but there is no way to know if this knowledge is available to
other industries as well. Vertical technology transfer, a
process within one industry, works quite well, In contrast,
there are no established mechanisms for horizontal technology
transfer, a process which takes place across organizational
and industry borders. Kottenstette and Rusnak describe these
three caveats (1973, p. 146);
(i) "Firms have varying degrees of technological alignment
with aerospace and their relative alignment is of
primary importance in effecting secondary utilization."
(ii) "Increased distance from the aerospace sector (Less
alignment with aerospace) decreases the likelihood
of new technology adoption through diffusion."
(iii) "Increased distance from the aerospace sector implies
that a planned effort is required to provide access
to the aerospace technology."
Communication between firms is important to the transfer
of technologies (see Utterback, 1971, p. 82, 83). To estimate
the value of aerospace technology for other industries, one
might use an "alignment structure" plan: (described below) and
organize transfer efforts around such a plan.
Such an alignment structure plan can be illustrated in
the form of a graph or a matrix which describes relations
between firn.y . Such an approach was used by Gzepiel (1975) to
explore the diffusion of the continuous casting process in
the steel industry. The arcs in the graph, or the elements in
the matrix, represent two kinds of flows--material and informa-
tion. It is valuable to consider firms and other organizations
f
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of the private and governmental sector which influence the
technology transfer process. That is to say, the alignment.
structure plan should represent the entire "technology
delivery system." The main components of a technology
delivery system are: source of R&D funding, R&D performers,
material supplier, manufacturer ^f the capital goods, pro-
ducers of the product, dis;;.ributors, ultimate users (see
also: Yin, 197a, p. ,
 13) .
In exploring the value of NASA technology for industry
one should keep in mind that this technology has been developed
for NASA mission--oriented R&D projects. This is to say that
the technology is not developed in a commercial environment.
There is a trend, as in the military field, to produce such
technologies as soon as it is technically feasible. Technical
feasibility is no guarantee of commercial success. of course,
there are a lot of fine, commercially successful technologies,
like integrated circuits, jet airplanes, etc. But there are
other cases, like the nuclear-driven ship.
To sum up, estimating the value of NASA technology is not
easy; it requires knowledge or at least three primary components.
First, the stage of technological development, from vague ideas
to prototypes. Second, the relation of other industries to
the industry generating the technology. Third, the commercial
"shape" of the technology.
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o Aside from the specific value of NASA generated
technology the value of externally generated information
about technologies in general has to be taken into account.
Many firms believe that externally generated knowledge, when
compared to its own R&D, is not as unique as is often claimed
(VDI, 1979, p. 18). It is important to realize that in any
case the firm must check the information. As a result, the
value of a Tech Brief is known to a firm only after a check
of its content; that is to say, after the firm has invested
time and money (Johnson et al., 1977a, p. 11).
Refusing to adapt externally generated technology seems
to be typical of U.S. firms, at least when compared to firms
in Japan and West Germany. There is some feeling that "an
overall increased sensitivity to and utilization of outside
technology must be developed..." (Gee, 1978, p. 212). In
general, such behavior is caused by factors described in the
previous section. For example, in chemical industries there
are huge and complex integrated production systems. The
change of one element might impact, on many other elements.
Therefore, incremental improvement is typical; major changes
of the production technology tend to be delayed. Major new
technologies are often created outside the established firms
but are, in many cases, neglected due to the large capital
investment in existing technology (see also: Abernathy,
Utterback, 1978, p. 41). Firms in the U.S. have also been
reluctant to undertake cooperative programs. While these
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programs are quite common in Europe only a few exist in the
United States (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1978, p. 58).
In the future this problem might be partly eliminated. The
experience of MIT after working with industry under a NSF
grant for several years indicates that once firms "enter into
cooperative research, they discover that it does not threaten
their competitive position" (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1978, p. 60).
The factors discussed above are only a few out of a large
set. It is not intended to provide a complete List. An
attempt was made to demonstrate that government R&D agencies
face specific difficulties in promoting technology transfer,
difficulties which add up to those confronting technology
transfer in general.
2.3 Summary evaluation of factors influencing technology transfer.
After raving discussed factors influencing technology
transfer in general and in particular those factors influencing
transfer from a government R&D agency to industry, a short
summary is provided in the following:
Factors Influencing Technology
Factors Influencing Technology 	 Transfer from Government R&D
Transfer in General	 Agencies to Industry
• relative efficiency of new
technologies compared to
those already in use
• availability of neighboring
technologies
• capital intensiveness of
new technologies
• value of externally generated
information about technologies
o psychological barriers to use
of government generated in-
formation and technology
o value of NASA generated
technology to industry
o relation between innovation
and innovator
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Factors Influencing Technology
Transfer in General (font"d)
o comparative advantage
achieved by the entre-
preneur
o market-creating and market-
destroying characteristics
of new technologies
o interdisciplinary barriers
o technical and business
alignment between
industries
o major changes of the pro-
duction technology in a
whole industry branch
o regulation
All of these factors may influence technology transfer
in a negative manner; at least to delay adoption of a new
technology. Therefore, to solve the application problem
described in the introduction of this paper, it would be ex-
tremely useful to explore NASA technologies with regards to
such factors. If the results of such investigations are added
to information about a certain technology, benefits might be
achieved. In case a new technology is announced by NASA, it
might he useful to know to what degree this technology fits
current industrial patterns. One can identify material sup-
pliers, producers of equipment, etc. which are able to supply
the technology. Such knowledge--gained by exploring factors
influencing the transfer process--provides a basis from
which to choose the right steps to put a technology to work.
To some extent, such value-added functions are performed by
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staff members of the Industrial Application Centers. Users
of the IACs' services can be directed to other organizations
working in a certan field. Furthermore, staff members of the
IACs provide valuable information concerning market analyses.
in order to realize a real breakthrough in technology transfer
such services should be provided on a comprehensive basis.
Und*r current conditions the screening and evaluation
process concerning the Tech Brief is performed mainly by the
Technology Utilization Officers at the single NASA Research
Centers in conjunction with the Illinois Institute for Tech-
nology Research Institute. The screening/evaluation process
employs the following criteria:
• marketing potential
• novelty
• technology
• nonaerospace potential
If an in-depth analysis of the factors influencing tech-
nology transfer is performed, it is likely that procedures can
be developed providing for substantial improvement in the
screening and evaluation process. Concerning the screening
and evaluation criteria of "marketing potential," the following
procedure might be developed.
o Marketing Potential
Market Destroying
	 o identification of already
Effects
	 existing technologies to be
replaced in part or in total.
o Anticipation of improvements
of technologies to be replaced.
o relative efficiency of existing
and new technologies over time..
k
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Market Destroying 	 o Estimation of future rate of
Effects (Cone'd)	 innovations concerning the
new technology.
o Necessary reorganizations of
existing production-, systems
to integrate the new technology.
As mentioned before, new technologies are both market
creating and market destroying. The market-destroying effect
is important in the development of market-potential estimates.
First, existing technologies which are likely to be replaced
in whole or in part should be identified. In many cases
those technologies already in use undergo substantial im-
provements if a new technology is expected. Therefore, such
improvements should be anticipated. Such investigations
establish a comparison of the relative efficiency of the
technologies already in use, and the new technology to be
introduced. This relative efficiency is one of the important
decision criteria in deter-lining if a new technology will be
used. Furthermore, the potential for further technological
innovations should be checked due to the fact that industry
is reluctant to invest in soon-to-be obsolete technology.
Also, necessary reorganizations of existing production systems
in order to integrate the new technology should be considered.
The information dissemination process might be made more
effective if the dissemination strategy were based upon a
structure alignment plan which indicated to what extent organi-
zations influencing technology transfer are linked together.
After discussing a screening and evaluation procedure
which takes into account factors influencing technology transfer,
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I will undertake an analysis of policy options to enhance
technology transfer,
Technology transfer has often been described as "technology
push" or "demand pull." Most empiri(.:al studies point; out the
superiority of demand pull. However f R&D agencies, like NASA,
are likely to push technologies. New technologies need pushing
in order to overcome barriers, especially in early transfer
phases. Often R&D agencies fail to push a new technology when
industry has a need for it In exploring factors influencing
technology transfer, as mentioned before, NASA should incor-
porate industry's needs in its information dissemination
policies. The outcome of this approach would be a mixed policy,
linking technology push and demand pull. This approach is
in Line with recent findings. An investigation performed by
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) provides an in-depth analysis of
eight of the best known empirical studies on technological
innovation which all support the demand pull policy. The
authors of the investigation, in analyzing these empirical
studies, claim that "the role of demand has been overextended
and misrepresented, with serious consequences for our under-
standing of the innovative process and of appropriate government
policy alternatives to foster innovation" (Mowery ( Rosenberg,
1979, p. 3). In the conclusion of their study, the authors
point out:
The existence of an adequate demand for the
eventual, product is, of course, an essential--a
necessary--condition. But, we suggest, the demand
pull approach simply ignores, or denies, the operation
of a complex and diverse set of supply side mechanisms
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which are continually altering the structure of
production costs (as well as introducing entirely
new products) and which are therefore fundamental
to the explanation. of the timing of the innovation
process.
At a more general, Level., the conceptual under-
pinnings of the "demand- pull" case are perhaps even
more fundamentally suspect. Rather than viewing
either the existence of a market demand or the
existence of a technological opportunity as each
representing a sufficient condition for innovation
to occur, one should consider them each as necessary,
but not sufficient for innovation to result; both
must exist simultaneously. (Mowery, Rosenberg,
1979, p. 57.)
in sum, successful technology transfer must be based upon both
technology-push and demand-pull. (see also: Hoelscher, Hummon,	 '
1977, p. 82; Gilpin, 1976, p. 174).
As such, NASA might consider the "timing of publishing."
To push a new technology at a time when industry has an urgent
need is Likely to produce more success than announcing a new
technology at any time. An empirical study of NASA generated
technologies published in a TECH BRIEF points out, that "the
degree of urgency of the problem to which the technology was
related seemed to be an important factor..." (Chakrabarti, 1972,
p. 162). At a time of low gasoline prises, where no substantial
change is expected, it is not appropriate to push electrical
automobile engines. But when gasoline prices are increasing,
industry might well be responsive.
of course, one might argue that it is not NASA's task to
explore industry's needs and that NASA should announce new
technologies when they are produced, making sure that the infor-
mation can be retrieved by industry at any time. Nevertheless,
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hitting the right target group at the right time with the
right information might lean to more effective technology
transfer and "timing of publishing" might be a method worth
considering.
in general, incorporation of users' needs in policies for
technology transfer is essential. This kind of approach is
now commonly employed by R&D funding organizations (Yin, 1978,
p. 12, 13)1 NASA's TT program, is an example. It is not a
question of whether or not a government R&D agency (like NASA)
should employ such an approach, but rather it is a question
of how to implement it.
3. Assessments of Arguments for a
3.1 Advantages of a team approach to screening/evaluation
The objective of this discussion is to describe possible
f	 positive effects on the technology transfer process of tech-
nology screening/evaluation using a team approach.
i
	 o one main advantage of screening and evaluation by a
team of industry/government individuals is that this approach
may come to grips with everchanging factors which influence
k
	
	 technology transfer. The discussion in previous sections has
outlined the difficulty of determining which factors influence
(positively or negatively) technology transfer. Furthemire,
underlying cause-effect relations are not constant but change
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over time and are difficult to anticipate. The author of
this paper assumes that a complete understanding of the factors
influencing technology transfer will never exist. This is
probably the main reason that the vast number of empirical
studies on technology transfer have provided only limited help
to policy makers formulating policies to enhance technology
transfer.
However, an effective transfer system should allow a
rapid check of which factors influencing technology transfer
are relevant--even in a time of rapidly changing cause-effect
relations--and thereby make possible the choice of an effective
transfer mechanism. A team approach might fulfill this task
because organizations influencing the technology transfer
process would participate in the screening and evaluation
process. Thus, the opportunity exist.; for all relevant infor-
mation to be promptly available. For NASA this approach would
provide a valuable opportunity to ask "what-if" questions of
extremely knowledgeable and technically capable partners.
o Assuming that other organizations joined the screening/
evaluation process, it is likely that a balanced assessment
of the potential value of NASA generated technology would be
possible. Furthermore, because most NASA technology is pro-
duced under relaxed commercial restrictions, and because tech-
nological feasibility alone is no guarantee that a certain
technology will be commericializable, industry hesitates "to
pick up" such technologies.
x
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Also, shortcomings in technology transfer occur because
potential users lack relevant information concerning commercial
feasibility (Udell, Johnson, 1978, p. 177). With the help of
other organizations, NASA might be able to provide such valuable	 {
additional information and thereby increase the probability
of successful transfers.
o An important "by-produc.-t" of a team approach to
screening/evaluation would be access to other transfer mediums.
In case a professional society participates, one might think
of announcing NASA generated technology in a variety of ways:
- in a professional society journal
under NASA's name
anonymously
as a standard publication
in an "innovation column"
- in a journal -issued by both NASA and the professional
society, etc.
There are many possibilities. The outcome of such options would
be (amongst others);
- a higher reputation for NASA technology because the
reader would consider NASA information as competitive
with other information announced by a professional
society
- better access to NASA information
concerning access to NASA information, it was mentioned
previously that under current conditions NASA information is
not that easily available to a potential user. Most information
is only published in NASA journals, such as contractor reports,
and it often takes a month or more to receive them. That is
too long a time lag for serious inquiries. In contrast, pro-
fessional society journals are available everywhere, and it is
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likely that a potential user of NASA generated technology
would be a regular reader of such journals.
Further, technical information is only one ,!actor in
stimulating technological innovation. Education, training
and experience also play an important role in that they prepare
target groups for new technologies (Utte =back, 1971, p. 80).
if universities and professional societies joined the screening
and evaluation process, it would create an opportunity to
disseminate NASA generated technology by means of training
and education. In. the long run this might lead to a sub-
stantial increase in technology transfer. To sum up, NASA
technology could be disseminated on a much wider basis using
existent and effective non-NASA channels.
o It is possible that the screening and evaluation process
itself, through the participation of other organizations, would
become a transfer process. This is particularly true when so-
called industry "gatekeepers" join the screening and evaluation
team (see also: Utterback, 1971, p. 64). This characteristic
of the team approach is of substantial importance. Several
studies point out that oral communication is an effective means
for the transfer of innovations because it provides rapid feed-
back communication (see: Tushman, 1978, p. 625). However,
along with this benefit, there is the possibility that NASA
might lose some control of the transfer process.
o Technology transfer is a national goal and is not the
exclusive responsibility of any government R&D agency alone.
The aim of the transfer process is to improve the nation's
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economy and is therefore the joint responsibility of all
societal groups. Participation of other groups should not be
judged as a shortcoming within NASA, but rather as a construc-
tive means to enhance technology transfer.
o Concern about competition between government R&D
agencies and industry is frequently mentioned. It is argued
that national laboratories engage in "research on technology
of commercial significance and thereby directly compete with
private industry" (Hollomon, 1973, p. 39). For instance, the
McNeil-Schwindler Co. protested NASA's maintenance work on
NASTRAN (a NASA computer program), claiming that such work
should be performed by private saftware houses. Evidence is
also cited to the effect that commercial R&D performed by a
government agency alone might be inefficient (Hollomon, 1979,
p. 32; Gilpin, 1976, P. 170). A team approach would establish
a forum in which the parties concerned could discuss such
problems at an early stage.
o A team approach to screening/evaluation would be
effective as well, due to the screening of technologies which
have no value for industry. In some recent literature on
technology innovation, technology, etc., the need for a team
effort to promote technology innovation and technology transfer
has been identified and evaluated.
3.2 Disadvantages of a team approach to screening/evaluation.
Since the early sixties, government-industry relations--
enforced mainly through regulation--have been of major concern
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to bath parties. All major firms now have at least one full-
time Washington, D.C. representative. Industry does not
passively accept government procedures. To the contrary, in-
dustry plays an active role. Established firms have large, and
high-quality staffs dedicated to government relations. One
of these tasks is to monitor government agencies' performance
and to anticipate their future activities.
Keeping this in mind, it is rather naive to assume that
industry would not use the possibility of a team approach to
screening/evaluation to try to influence NASA's activities.
A possible outcome would be the overiientification of NASA's
work with industry's interest. Overidentification of govern-
ment agencies with industries is a well.-known fact. One
opinion of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) states
that: "...the root of the FCC's problems is the agency's
overidentification with the industries it regulates, its over.-
identification with the powerful and entrenched elements, in
contrast to new and emerging facets or technolog ,.es, of the
industries regulated" (Geller, 1975, p. 706). In this view,
cause and effect are clearly described. Overidentification of
a government agency with industry leads to a slowdown of tech-
nological advance. This is discussed in greater detail below.
o One of NASA's roles as a governmental. R&D agency is
to undertake R&D projects with high-risk, long-term pay
 off,
high social rate of return as compared to the private rate
of return, etc. Normally, private industry is unlikely to
engage in such projects. The lack of private sector initiative
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in the development of communication satellite technology .after
1972, when NASA's efforts were curtailed, is a case in point
(see: office of Science and Technology, 1978, p. 4).
o Some of NASA's projects stem from high priority
industry needs. For industry, NASA is a prime source of
R&D funding. Potentially a team approach to screening/
evaluation could be misused for "doing industry's work."
o Also, the possibility of unfair technology transfer
exists. If a team approach to screening/evaluation is estab-
lished, NASA must offer the body of its knowledge to all
participating parties.
o The team approach will only work if an appropriate
climate of confidence is created. Members might not express
their thoughts if they are likely to read them in the news-
papers. Therefore, the team approach might not work under the
conditions within which government organizations must operate.
Strictly speaking, the "protection of the public interest" is
critical. But it is often claimed, for example, that labor
unions and "consumer representatives" should join industry
committees (See e.g.: Brown, 1970, p. 31). In the past, in
connection with follow-up analysis of industry's use of IAC
services, NASA has experienced industry's sensitivity to
information. The team approach has the potential of indicating
to NASA which NASA-generated technologies are of substantial
interest to industry; thereby providing a most valuable
basis from which NASA can make its information dissemination
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program more effective. But if the necessary condition of
confidence canno,, , be created, the value of a team approach to
screening and evaluation will only be moderate.
o In establishing procedures where other parties join
the planning and decision-making of a government organization,
one must recognize that the non-governmental members of the
x
	 team are likely to try to shift the risk of failure to the
government agency. On the other hand, NASA cannot delegate
its responsibility for secondary utilization of aerospace
technology to the team. If the team approach is adopted,
NASA must maintain the ultimate responsibility for technology
transfer.
A team approach to screening/evaluation then has ad-
vantages as well as disadvantages. The disadvantages-- at
least most of those mentioned above--occur by an overidentifi-
cation of NASA with industry's interests. Yet, this possibility
seems unlikely. Government agencies can be put in two main
categories; industry-oriented (e.g. FCC) and functionally-
oriented, or crosscutting (e.g. EPA). While industry-oriented
agencies may be captured by the interest of the industry they
regulate, this may be less likely for functionally-oriented
agencies (see also: Weidenbaum, 1978, p. 10). In the secondary
utilization of aerospace technology, NASA can be described as
a functionally-oriented agency, with the task of transferring
technology to all non-aerospace industries. The possibility
of being captured by the interests of a single non-aerospace
industry exists but does not seem to be a real threat.
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F3.3 Review of a team approach to screening/evaluation.
Only a comprehensive analysis will indicate the advantages
and disadvantages of a team approach to screening/evaluation
of NASA generated technology. Critical to the success of such
an approach is the organizational structure which provides the
basis for cooperation between NASA and the participating
parties:
o Should other participating parties serve as an
advisory board to provide suggestions and recommen-
dations, leaving decisions to NASA?
o Should NASA be only one party among many, that is to
say should NASA have no special power concerning
decisions?
o Should NASA and other parties be bound together in an
advisory board and the responsibility for decisions
be given to another federal organization?
These and other organizational options should be comparatively
analyzed.
The advantage of a team approach to screening/evaluation
is provided through the direct participation of private and gov-
ernmental organizations which influence the technology transfer
process. It can be assumed that the team approach has particular
potential when the operations are based upon people rather than
on fixed procedures. Procedures, most valuable for routine
tasks, are not appropriate to the exploration of the changing
factors which influence technology transfer. But this pattern
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is twofold, in being dependent on the capability of the in-
dividuals joining the team, the performance of team members
is a source of potential success and failure. This should be
taken into account, especially in the implementation phase.
It might be effective for NASA--before announcing the im-
plementation of its team approach to screening/evaluation--
to very carefully select individuals who are both capable and
willing to perform the task. This selection process might
best be achieved through informal contacts, keeping publicity
very low. Furthermore, in case this screening/evaluation
method is adopted, NASA should resist any moves to demonstrate
its potential before the team is stabilized that is to say,
not until all individuals joining the team have accepted
their role within the team and a climate of confidence has
been created.
4. Potential members for the team.
The intention of this section is to cite and briefly
describe organizations which could participate in the team
approach to the screening/evaluation. Once again, only a
comprehensive analysis can provide in-depth insights.
o One source of participants are industry specific
r
	
	
R&D institutes. Besides the R&D effort of specific firms,
there are often R&D projects undertaken by all (or the most
important) firms within an industry branch. In some industries
those R&D activities are institutionalized in the form of
R&D institutes, e.g. the Chemical Industry Institute of
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Toxicology. This institute is funded by the largest U.S.
chemical companies and investigates the toxicology of non-
proprietary chemicals (Hiss et al., 1975, p. 97). In Vilest
Germany the "Institut der Stahl- and Eisenindustrie," has
performed important studies for the steel industry on the
development of mathematical process models for control of
blast-furnace processes.
Normally, such institutes know the characteristics of
technologies already being used and those in research
programs.. This knowledge would be extremely useful in iden-
tifying those NASA technologies having potential value for a
certain industry. Furthermore, such institutes might prove
useful in aiding NASA's development of prototypes.
o Another valuable organization might be industry
associations. Industry associations possess substantial
knowledge about the R&D performance of the industry they
represent. For example, the association of the chemical
industry knows under which circumstances this indnt;try will be
willing to switch from coal to oil. Therefore, NASA is
able to grasp "what is going on in industry".and to prepare
appropriate transfer efforts at the right time. NASA might
also gain knowledge about typical industry R&D policies. For
example, in areas such as semiconductors, electronic sub-
assemblies and scientific instruments, process innovations are
not "manufacturer dominated" but "user dominated" (Hippel,
1976; Hipped, 1977, p. 60; Abernathy, Utterback, 1978, p. 42).
In other industries, raw material suppliers or the producers
I
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of capital goods might dominate innovative behavior. In
processing such knowledge, NASA would enhance its ability to
address the right target group with information about new
i
technologies.
i
As mentioned earlier, NASA technology transfer managers
i
may lack "commercial experience." With the help of industry 	 1
associations NASA might be able to use commercial facts to
provide useful value-added technological information.
o The possibility also exists that single firms might
join the screening and evaluation process of NASA technology.
At first glance, it seems that industry R&D line managers
would be highly qualified to perform such work. But diffi-
culties in selecting firms would undoubtedly arise. These
difficulties can be avoided through the use of industry
associations and professional societies.
o Professional societies might be a valuable organization
for screening and evaluating NASA's technologies. In most
cases such societies represent a substantial part of pro-
fessionals working in a certain field, and they generally
have good reputations. In some cases those societies already
evaluate new technologies and offer education to their members
concerning those technologies. Education is important. The
mere existence of a technology is not sufficient; a capability
to use it must be developed (Gee, 1978, p. 109).
In West'Germany, starting in 1978, the Ministry of
Science and Technology realized the high potential value of
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professional societies. The societies perform work similar
to that of NASA's Industrial Application Centers.
in an investigation about "diffusion and utilization of
scientific and technological knowledge within state and
local governments" it is noted that professional engineering
societies, e.g. the American Society for Mechanical Engineering,
are interested in becoming involved in the area of technology
transfer (Feller, Flanary, 1979, p. III-41).
o in some cases it might be worthwh"Lle to think about
the possibility of including certain government agencies in
the screening and evaluation process, at least, on a case-by-
case basis. This is due to the fact that while technologies
might improve productivity or dampen inflation, they might
also have side-effects for health, safety, environment,
etc.
The costs of determining if a new technology will obtain
regulatory authority approval can be an important factor in
the introduction of innovations in technology (Hollomon, 1979,
p. 33; see also: Weidenbaum, 1978, p. 17-20). If the concerned
government agencies participate in the proposed screening and
evaluation process of new technologies, they could facilitate
the innovation process. If regulatory information were added
to the technical description of a new technology, a potential
entrepreneur could more readily assess its commercial prospects.
i
	
	 o Organizations within the university community present
another possibility. There are two groups of major importance,
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scientific and technology utilization personnel. Professors
are a very valuable group to have join the screening and evalu-
ation process. Furthermore, in this case it is worthwhile to
4
consider a secondary benefit of using universities. Univer-
sities are of substantial importance as a transfer medium and
would link NASA directly to the professionals of tomorrow.
,
One might also think about university technology utili-
zation personnel. in recent years university administrations
have explored the revenue generating value of university
generated inventions (Ud6ll, Johnson, 1978 0 p. 75) and by now
quite a few universities are active in this area.
conclusions
Underlying the analysis in this paper is the assumption
that the NASA technology transfer, could be substantially im-
proved if the application process of technologies were better
understood. NASA is successful at information dissemination,
but there is a lack of knowledge about why certain technologies
are adopted and other technologies are not. A comprehensive
understanding about factors influencing technology transfer
might indicate ways of developing improvements. By including
non--federal organizations, such as professional societies and
industry R&D institutes, in the screening and evaluation process
of NASA generated technology, opportunities may develop to
enhance technology transfer from NASA to industry.
References
Abernathy, William J., & Utterback, James M., (1978): Patterns
of industrial innovation, Technology Review, Vol. 80, No. 71
June/July, pp. 41-47.
Anyos, Tom, et al. (1978): Technology Transfer-Transportation,
Annual Report 1978, prepared for National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, Technology Utilization Office, Ames
Research Center, Moffet Field, CA 94035, Contract NAS2-9846.
Baer, Walter S. et al. (1976): Analysis of Federally Funded
Demonstration Projects Final Report, prepared for the
Experimental Technology Incentives Program, U.S. Department
of Commerce, The RAND Corporation, Report R-1926-DOC, April
1976.
Brown, David S. (1970): Statement before the Subcommittee on
Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government
Operations, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress,
Second Session on 5.3067 1 October 6 and 7, 1970, Part 1,
ppr1	 7G_44.	 8 - V .
Chakrabarti, Alok K. (1973): The Effects of the Techno-
Economic and Organizational Factors on the Adoption of NASA-
INNOVATIONS by Commercial firms in the U.S., in: T. B. Green
and F. R. Dennis, (Eds.), Academy of Management Proceedings,
33rd Annual Meeting, Boston, Mass., Aug. 19-22, pp. 469-475.
Chakrabarti, A1ok K. (1972): The effects of techno-economic
and organizational factors on the adoption of NASA-Innovations,
Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University.
Cheung, et al. (1976): Contractual Arrangements and the Captura-
bility of Returns in innovations: Report of a Pilot Investi-
gation, University of Washington, Seattle.
Congress of the United States (1978): A Ball to enhance commer-
cial and technological innovation within the context of other
national goals, and for other purposes, 96th Congress of the
United States, Staff Working Draft, Dec. 19, 1978.
Commoner, Barry (1979): The Politics of Energy, New York.
Cooper, et al. (1973): Strategic responses to technological
threats, in: T. B. Green and F. R. Dennis, (Eds.), Academy
of Management Proceedings, 33rd Annual Meeting, Boston,
Mass., Aug. 19-22, 1973, pp. 54-59.
49
Czepiel, John A. (1975): Patterns of interorganizational
communications and the diffusion of a major technological
innovation in a competitive community, in; Academy of
Management,
   Vol.. 18, No. 1 0 March, pp. 6-24.—
Dunn, Donald A. (1979a): The economic basis for national
science and technology policy, October 1979, Report No
23 Program, ,n Information Policy, Engineering-Economic
Systems Dept., Stanford University.
Feller, Irwin, and Flanary, Patricia E. (1979): Diffusion
and utilization of scientific and technological knowledge
within state and local governments, Institute for Policy
Research and Evaluation, The Pennsylvania State University,
Report to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
under Contract NAS5-24329.
Gee, Edwin A. (1978): Moving technology around, Les Nouvelles
Journal of the Licensing Executives Societ , Vo . XIII, No. 21
June, . 169-111.
Gee, Sherman (1978): Factors effecting innovation time, Les
Nouvelles Journal of the Licensing Executives Society,
Vol. XIII, No. 3 1 Sept., pA. 6-212.
Geller, Henry (1975) A modern proposal, for modest reform of
the Federal. Communications Commission, .in: The Georgetown
Law Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3 1 February ► pp. 705-7
Gilpin, Roberti (1976); The Government's role in fostering
technological innovation, in; Technological Innovation an
Economic Development. Has the U.S. lost the initiative?
Proceedings on a Symposium on Technological innovation,
Washington, D.C., April 19-20, 1976.
Gruber, William H. (1969): The development and utilization of
technology in industry, in: Gruber & Marquis (Eds.), Factors
in the Transfer of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., London,
Haggerty, James J. (1978): Spinoff 1978, an annual report,
Office of Space and Terrestrial Applications, Technology
Utilization Division, National Aeronautics and Space
r	 Administration.
Hill, Christopher T., et al. (1975): A state of the art of
effects of regulation on technical innovation in the
chemical and allied products industries, Vol, II, study
prepared for the National Science Foundation, Grant No.
RDA 74-20086 A01.
Hippel, Eric von (1976): The dominant role of users in the
scientific instrument innovation process, Research Policy,
Vol. 5, pp. 212-239.
5o
^E
Hippel, Eric von
semiconductor
tion, IEEE Tr
EM--24, No. 2f
(1977): The dominant role of the user in
and electronic oubassembly process innova--
neactons on Engineering Management, Vol.
, Pp ou-
Hoelscher, H. E., & Hummon, N. P. (1977): Policies affecting
technology transfer, Les Nouvellesi Journal of the Licensing
Executives Society, Vol. XII, Not 2 1
 June, pp. 76-84.
Hoffman, Wolf D. (1976): Market structure and strategies of
R&D behavior in the data processing market
	 theoretical
thoughts and empircal findings, ins Research Policy 5,
pp. 334-533.
Hollomon, Herbert J. (1979): Government and the innovation
process, in: Technology Review, Vol. 81, No. 6 (May),
pp. 30-41.
Johnson, Douglas F., et al.. (1977x): NASA Tech Brief Program:
a Cost Benefit Evaluation, prepared for Office of industry
Affairs and Technology Utilization, National. Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Washington, D.C., Contract N,ASW-
2892.
Johnson, Douglas F., et al. (1977b): NASA Technology Utiliza-
tion Program, a Summary of Cost Benefit Studies, prepared
for Office of Technology Utilization, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Washington, D.C., Contract NASW-
3021.
Knight, Kenneth E., & Baca, Helen R. (1978): The role of
government in industrial innovation, Long-Range Planning,
Vol. TI, No. 6, Dec., PP• 79-88.
Kottenstette, James P., & Rusnak, Jerome. J. (1973)
	 A new
perspective on the intersectoral movement of new technology,
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Development, Vol. EM-20,
• : PP • 102-
Lapple, Horstfried (1978): Modellunterstuetzte Planung der
Produktionstechnik in der Prozessindustrie unter besonderer
Beruecksichtigung des Umweltschutzes, Entwurf von Modellen
fuer Industriebetrebe and oeffentliche Planungstraeger,
Ph.D. dissertation, Technische Hochschule Darmstadt,
Darmstadt, West Germany.
(English translation)
Lapple, Horstfried (1978): Planning of Production Technology
in Chemical Process Industries with Particular Regards to
Environmental Pollution - Development of Models for
Industries and Governmental. Agencies-, Ph.D dissertation,
Technische Hochschule Darmstadt, Darmstadt, West Germany.
51
l
Little, John D. G. (1979): What strategy for ORSA, in:
OR MS Today, Operations Research/Management Science, Vol.
r	 6, No. 3, May-June, pp. 4-5.
Locke, Brian H. (1978): Planning innovation, in: Long
Range Planning, Vol. II, No. 6 1 Dec., pp. 21-29^
McClain, William T. (1976): Marketing of Process Technology,
Les Nouvelles Journal of Licensing Executives Society,
Vol. XI, No	 , June, pp.	 .
j	 Meissner, W., and Hoedl, E. (1976): Positive oekonomische
Aspekte des Umweltsrhutzes. Gutachten fuer den
Bundesminister des Innern.
(English translation)
Meissner, W., and Hoedl, E. (1976): Positive economic
aspects of environmental protection. Study performed
for the German Department of the Interior.
Mowery, David, and Rosenberg, Nathan (1978): The influence
of market demand upon innovation; a critical review of
son►e recent empirical= studies, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA, to appear in Research Policy in 1979.
Office of Science and Technology (1978): Summary of Survey
on the Federal Role in Satellite Communications Research
and ,Development, Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Executive office of the President, Washington, D.C.,
July 1, 1978.
Olken, Herman (1972): Technology transfer: How to make
it work, Livermore, CA
Pi.erskalla, William P. (1979): An open letter to authors
of papers submitted to Operations Research, in: OR MS
Toda', Operations Research/Management Science, Vol. 6,
N o. 2, March-April, p. 8.
Ray, G. F. (1969): The diffusion of new technology, a
study cf ten processes in nine industries, National
Economic Review, No. 48, May 1969, pp. 40-100.
Rosenberg, Nathan (1976a): Perspectives on technology,
Cambridge.
Rosenberg, Nathan (1976b): On technological expectations,
The Economic Journal, 86 (September), pp. 523-535.
52
&F
Teich, Albert H. (1978): Perspectives on the assessment of
domestic technology transfer, in: Domestic Technology
Transfer: issues and options, prepared for the Subcom-
mittee on Science, Research and Technology of the
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session,
Vol. i t pp. 149-165.
Thurow, Lester C. (1978): Eight imperatives for R&D,
Technology Review, Vol. 80, No. 3, January, pp. 64-70.
Tushman, Michael L. (1.978): Technical. Communication in
R&D Laboratories: The Impact of Project Work Character-
istics, in: Academy of Management, Vol. 21, No, 4,
December, pp. 62V6M
Udell, Gerald G., & Johnson, Richard D. (1978): Campus
attitudes change, Les Nouvelles Journal of the Licensing
Executives Society, Vol. XIII, No. 3, Sept., pp. 175-177.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Procurement and Systems
Acquisition Division (1978): Domestic Technology Transfer
Projects in three federal Agencies, in= Domestic Technology
Transfer: issues and options, prepared by the Subcommittee
on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives,
Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, Vol. I, pp. 41-76.
Utterback, James M. (1971): The Process of Technological
Information within the fixm, in: Academy of Management,
Vol. 14, No. 1, March, pp. 75-88
Utterback, James N,, (1976): The dynamics of technological
behavior, in; :as the U.S. lost the initative? Proceedings
on a Symposium on Technological Innovation, Washington, D.C.,
April 19-20, 1976.
Vprein Deutscher Ingenieure (1.979): Transferhilfe fuer
Erfindungen, ein System zur weiten Verbreitung technischer
Indeen, VDI-Nachrichten, Nr. 16, 20. April, p. 18.
(English translation)
Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (1979): Transfer aids for
innovations, a system for the dissemination of technical
ideas, VDI-Nachrichten, Nr. 16, 20. April, p. 18.
Weidenbaum, Murray L. (1978): The costs of government
regulation of business, a study prepared for the Sub-
committee on Economic Growth and Stabilization of the
Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States,
April 10, 1978, U.S. Government Printing Office.
53
W
Yin, Robert K. (1978): Contemporary issues in domestic
technology transfer, in: Domestic Technology Transfer:
Issues and Options, prepared by the Subcommittee on
Science, Research and Technology of the Committee on
Science aAd Technology, U.S. House of Representatives,
Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, Vol.. I, November,
pp. 3-39.
54
F
